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                              Petitioners,   
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                                Respondent 
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA 1:A077-997-645 and BIA 1:A088-777-224) 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Frederic Leeds 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 14, 2011 
 
Before:   FISHER, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 22, 2011 ) 
_______________ 
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Gary J. Yerman, Esq.  
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New York, NY   10013  
          Counsel for Petitioners  
 
Dalin R. Holyoak, Esq. 
Kevin J. Conway, Esq. 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
Civil Division 
U.S. Department of Justice 
P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC   10044 
          Counsel for Respondent 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Li Hua Yuan petitions for review of an order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying her 
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  
Her husband, Zhuo Gui Ni, joins her petition on a derivative 
basis.  For the following reasons, we will deny the petition. 
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I. Background 
 
Yuan, a native and citizen of China, arrived in the 
United States in February 2002 and attempted to gain entry 
using a non-immigrant visa issued to her under a false name.    
Shortly thereafter, in a secondary inspection, Yuan told an 
immigration officer that she was single, from Nantang Wan 
Li Village, Lian Jiang District, Fuzhou City, Fujian Province, 
China, and that she had fled China because her impoverished 
parents were forcing her to marry a man in exchange for 
money.  The next month, in March 2002, the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued Yuan a Notice to Appear 
(“NTA”), charging her with being inadmissible for lack of 
proper documentation in violation of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), and for fraudulently or willfully 
misrepresenting a material fact – namely her identity – to gain 
entry to the United States in violation of INA 
§ 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).     
 
In July 2002, Yuan filed an application for asylum and 
withholding of removal.1
                                              
1 Yuan’s application does not clearly indicate that she 
was seeking relief under the CAT.  She was nevertheless 
treated as having sought CAT relief.   
    She identified two bases for 
asylum:  the impending forced marriage in China and the 
punishment she would receive from the Chinese government 
for being a practitioner of Falun Gong.  In October 2003, after 
hearing Yuan’s testimony, an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
sustained DHS’s charge of inadmissibility for lack of proper 
documentation and denied Yuan’s application, finding that 
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she was not credible and, in any case, had not shown that she 
satisfied the requirements for asylum, withholding of 
removal, or protection under the CAT.2
 Yuan timely moved to reopen her removal proceedings 
in July 2005 and attached a new asylum application.  In her 
new application, Yuan claimed that she and Ni had given 
birth to a daughter in December 2004, that they were planning 
to have additional children, and that she “fear[ed] that if she 
is sent back to China, she [would] lose the chance to have as 
many children as she likes” due to Fujian Province’s birth 
control policy, which, in Yuan’s case, would permit no more 
than two children.
  In April 2005, the 
BIA denied Yuan’s appeal without opinion.    
 
3
Yuan again moved to reopen in May 2007.  She also 
attached to her motion an amended version of her July 2005 
asylum application, which included documentation indicating 
that she had given birth to a second daughter and documents 
regarding enforcement of China’s birth control policy.  In 
September 2007, the BIA granted the motion to reopen.  The 
  (See App. 2 at 1066.)  In September 
2005, the BIA denied the motion to reopen, concluding that, 
since Yuan’s one child did not put her in contravention of the 
policy and Yuan had presented no evidence that China 
sterilizes its citizens for having foreign-born children, Yuan 
had failed to show a well-founded fear of persecution in 
China.   
 
                                              
2 The IJ did not address the fraud charge under INA 
§ 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).  
3 The policy allegedly permitted a second child, if the 
first child was female.   
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BIA explained that, since Yuan was seeking to reapply for 
asylum and withholding of removal based on changed 
circumstances in China, the motion fell within the timeliness 
and numerical limits exception under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).4  The BIA further explained that, since the 
authenticity of Yuan’s family planning policy documents had 
not been resolved, it was appropriate to remand Yuan’s case 
to an IJ to “hold additional hearings to address the 
authenticity of the evidence presented with the motion, … 
[Yuan]’s credibility, and her eligibility for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT.”5
                                              
4 As we have previously explained, the birth of 
children in the United States is a change in personal 
circumstances, not a change in conditions in China.  Liu v. 
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Thus, the BIA’s analysis should have focused on whether 
Yuan had presented evidence that was previously unavailable 
or undiscoverable since her last hearing.  See id. 
(commending the BIA for focusing on availability of 
evidence).  However, that issue, which would have arisen 
from the motion to reopen, is not before us now.   
  
(App. 2 at 911.)    
5 At about this time in the chronology of events, May 
2008, DHS issued an NTA to Ni, charging him with removal 
under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), 
because he was allegedly a native and citizen of China who 
had entered the United States without having been admitted 
or paroled by an immigration officer.  Ni filed his own 
asylum application, claiming that he had married Yuan in 
January 2008, that they together had two daughters, and that 
either he or Yuan would be forcibly sterilized by the Chinese 
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In advance of Yuan’s post-remand hearing, Yuan and 
DHS submitted several documents to the IJ, including 
information on China’s birth control policies and, from Yuan, 
various affidavits, letters, statements, and certificates in 
support of her claims.  The IJ delayed the proceedings several 
times so that Yuan or DHS could satisfy authentication 
concerns about Yuan’s documents, but neither party was able 
to do so.  DHS objected to much of Yuan’s documentary 
evidence, noting that several items were copies instead of 
originals and lacked appropriate corroboration and 
authentication.  The IJ ultimately admitted Yuan’s documents 
but noted that the “legitimate issues” raised with respect to 
their authenticity could affect their evidentiary weight.  (Id. at 
184-86.) 
 
After dealing with those preliminary questions, the IJ 
conducted a hearing in May 2009, at which Yuan testified.  
Yuan said that she was born in China’s Fujian Province, met 
                                                                                                     
government if they returned.  At a hearing held approximately 
two weeks later, Ni admitted the allegations in the NTA and 
conceded that he was removable as charged.  Shortly 
thereafter, the IJ granted Ni and Yuan’s motion to consolidate 
their cases.  Ni later withdrew his claims for withholding of 
removal and CAT protection – his asylum application was not 
filed within one year of entering the United States and so was 
untimely under INA § 208 (a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(a)(2)(B) – and proceeded on a derivative basis on 
Yuan’s application.  Accordingly, we address only Yuan’s 
claims, even though the determination with respect to Yuan 
applies with equal force to Ni.    
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and married Ni after she came to the United States in 
February 2002, and gave birth here to two daughters.  She 
testified that, if returned to China, she would be sterilized or 
fined under her home village’s birth control policy because 
she had two children and was still a citizen of China.  She 
claimed that she learned of her home village’s birth control 
policy from a letter sent by her father, who, at her request, 
had approached the village committee to inquire regarding the 
policy.  Yuan also submitted documents purportedly 
recounting the experiences of persons who had been subject 
to enforcement of birth control in China:  one was a letter 
from someone allegedly named Yang Yun Duan, a neighbor 
in Yuan’s village, in which Duan claimed to have been 
subject to forced contraception after the birth of her first child 
and forced sterilization after the birth of her second child; the 
others included statements from Jin Fu Chen, whose wife had 
given birth to two children in Japan and who was allegedly 
sterilized upon return to China, and Yanyun Wu, who was 
allegedly fined and sterilized for fathering a second child in 
China after having already fathered a son.   
 
Yuan further testified that she would be fined 30,000 
to 50,000 Renminbi (“RMB”), which, under the then-
prevailing exchange rate of 6 RMB to 1 dollar, equated to a 
fine ranging from $5,000 to $8,333.  She claimed that she 
would be unable to pay such a fine if returned to China, since 
she would stay at home with the children and Ni would 
probably earn an estimated 400 to 500 RMB per month as a 
construction worker.  Yuan said that, though she was not then 
working in the United States, she had earned $10,000 per year 
working part-time in a restaurant and that Ni also worked in a 
restaurant, giving them a combined annual income of 
$25,000.  She also said that she had been able to repay the 
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$40,000 she owed to the smugglers who brought her to the 
United States only because her wages were higher in the 
United States than in China.   
 
Yuan’s claim for relief was undercut, however, by 
several evidentiary deficiencies and contradictions.  For 
instance, she failed to produce her father’s letter explaining 
the village family planning policy, including the fine 
schedule.  The letter from her neighbor Duan gave as the 
neighbor’s name “Yunrui Yang” rather than “Yang Yun 
Duan,” as Yuan had claimed, and it was not authenticated.  
Neither was there authentication for the documentation 
concerning others who submitted statements on Yuan’s 
behalf.  When asked why she made no mention of a fine in 
her asylum application after having testified at the hearing 
about it being of paramount importance, Yuan testified that 
she forgot about it.  Yuan could not explain the discrepancy 
between her testimony of a 30,000 to 50,000 RMB fine and 
the Duan letter, which mentioned only a 15,000 RMB fine.  
Yuan produced no tax returns to corroborate her testimony 
regarding her and Ni’s household earnings.  She testified that 
both of her children had traveled with their aunt to China, 
where they then lived for a number of years with Ni’s mother 
and sister and were temporarily registered as part of Ni’s 
mother’s household without any family member being fined 
or otherwise disadvantaged.  She also testified that she and Ni 
would reside in the town of Guantao and be registered as part 
of Ni’s household if they returned to China, but she failed to 
produce any evidence of a Guantao birth control policy.  And 
though Yuan testified that she planned to have more children 
and had been trying to conceive for the past two years, she 
had not consulted with a physician to confirm whether she is 
able to have more children.   
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 Following Yuan’s testimony, the IJ issued an oral 
decision finding Yuan removable and denying her asylum, 
withholding of removal, or relief under the CAT.  The IJ 
analyzed Yuan’s asylum claim under pre-REAL ID Act 
standards because Yuan had filed her original claim prior to 
the REAL ID Act’s enactment in 2005, though the IJ noted 
that his conclusion about the case would be the same under 
post-REAL ID Act standards.6  The IJ credited the State 
Department Report and Profile on China, which indicated that 
China did not have a policy of forcible sterilization or fines 
for Chinese nationals who simply return to China after having 
given birth abroad to two or more children.7
                                              
6 The REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 
231, 302 (2005), which became effective on May 11, 2005, 
provides that an asylum applicant’s uncorroborated testimony 
may alone satisfy his burden of proof “if the applicant 
satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is 
credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to 
demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii).  In evaluating the testimony, the trier of 
fact may weigh it along with other record evidence and may 
request that the applicant provide corroborating evidence, 
which the applicant must do unless he “does not have the 
evidence and cannot reasonably obtain [it].”  Id.  The REAL 
ID Act further provides that the trier of fact may determine an 
applicant’s credibility based on a variety of factors.  Id. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
  The IJ gave less 
7 As the IJ noted, the State Department Report and 
Profile did indicate some problems for parents attempting to 
obtain free public services for children born abroad, but it 
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weight to Yuan’s evidence and observed that the village 
committee documentation and other letters regarding forced 
sterilization and fines were neither authenticated nor directly 
applicable to someone whose children were born in the 
United States and that Yuan knew of no similarly situated 
person who had been subject to sterilization or fines.  As for 
the purported potential fine, the IJ found that Yuan’s claimed 
fear was not credible, noting, inter alia, the discrepancy 
between Yuan’s testimony and Duan’s letter about the 
amount of a fine, Yuan’s failing to corroborate the amount of 
the fine or her inability to pay, the children having lived in 
China with Ni’s mother without fines or difficulty, and 
Yuan’s failing to even mention the fine in her application for 
relief.  The IJ ultimately concluded that Yuan had not met her 
burden of proof with respect to her asylum, withholding of 
removal, and CAT protection claims.     
 
Yuan then looked to the BIA, but the BIA dismissed 
her appeal.  It disagreed with the IJ regarding the applicability 
of the REAL ID Act, concluding that the asylum application 
attached to Yuan’s 2007 motion to reopen asserted a new 
basis for relief and was thus a new application subject to the 
REAL ID Act.  However, “upon … de novo review,” (App. 2 
at 3), the BIA agreed with the IJ that Yuan had failed to prove 
that she was entitled to relief.  The BIA identified several 
deficiencies in Yuan’s evidence, including that much of it 
was either stale, unrelated to birth control policies in Fujian 
province, or contradicted by background materials and thus 
                                                                                                     
also indicated that parents could avoid those problems by 
paying for services and not registering their children with the 
government.   
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did not reflect current conditions in Guantao.  It noted that 
Yuan had established only that fines are sometimes imposed 
in Guantao, not that she would be fined 30,000 to 50,000 
RMB or that she would be unable to pay such a fine, and it 
indicated that her evidence of forced sterilization – i.e., the 
materials from Duan, Chen, Wu, and Yuan’s home village – 
was not “credible, individualized evidence establishing that 
she has reason to fear persecution upon return,” because it 
was either inapposite or unauthenticated.  Having failed in her 
efforts before the BIA, Yuan now petitions us for review. 
 
II. Discussion8
 
 
 We “review the administrative record on which the 
final removal order is based.”  Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 
150, 155 (3d Cir. 2005).  Ordinarily, that means reviewing 
only the BIA’s decision.  Id.  However, where the BIA’s 
decision affirms and specifically references the IJ’s decision, 
we review the referenced portions of the IJ’s decision also.  
Sandie v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 
2009); Lin v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 543 F.3d 114, 119 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  Since the BIA’s decision here references the IJ’s 
determinations with respect to Yuan’s failures to establish 
eligibility for CAT protection and to corroborate her 
testimony regarding fine amounts, we review those portions 
of the IJ’s decision along with the BIA’s decision.  Our 
review of factual findings, including findings of persecution 
and fear of persecution, is for substantial evidence, which 
                                              
8 The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
12 
 
means we must uphold findings of fact unless the record 
evidence compels a contrary finding.  Sandie, 562 F.3d at 
251.  We review legal conclusions de novo.  Id. 
 
In her petition, Yuan argues that the BIA erred in 
assessing the sufficiency of her evidence and in engaging in 
de novo review of the IJ’s factual findings.  We address those 
issues in turn.9
                                              
9 Yuan also takes issue with the BIA’s conclusion that 
her current asylum application is a new application filed after 
May 2005 and so is subject to the REAL ID Act.  Whether 
the REAL ID Act applies can be significant because it 
imposes certain conditions upon asylum applicants regarding 
credibility and corroborating evidence.  See supra note 6 
(outlining 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii)).  Yuan argues 
that the REAL ID Act should not apply because the current 
application is merely a continuation of her initial application 
filed in July 2002 and so predates the REAL ID Act.  We 
disagree and instead, for the reasons the BIA set forth, 
conclude that Yuan’s application raises a new basis for 
asylum following a motion to reopen and so is a new 
application rather than a continuation of the initial one, which 
had raised different bases for asylum and had been dismissed.   
 
In any event, Yuan’s concern is of no moment.  First, 
the BIA expressly declined to address Yuan’s credibility.  
Thus, even if Yuan could have been subject to the REAL ID 
Act’s credibility provision, as a practical matter, she was not.  
Second, to the extent that Yuan was subject to the REAL ID 
Act’s corroboration provision, it was effectively 
indistinguishable from what she would have been subject to 
under pre-REAL ID Act law, since under both regimes the 
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A. The Sufficiency of Yuan’s Evidence 
 
 “To qualify for asylum or withholding of removal, an 
applicant must establish that he has a well-founded fear that 
he will be persecuted if removed to his home country on 
account of  [, among other things,] … political opinion.”  
Zheng v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 
2008).  “[A] person who has a well founded fear that he or 
she will be forced to [abort a pregnancy or undergo 
involuntary sterilization] or [is] subject to persecution for 
[failure, refusal, or resistance to undergo such a procedure] 
shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of persecution on 
account of political opinion.”  Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(42)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To receive 
asylum on account of a fear of forced sterilization, the 
applicant must show “a reasonable likelihood” that he or she 
will be forcibly sterilized upon repatriation.   Id.  To receive 
withholding of removal on that same basis, the applicant must 
make the similar but heightened showing that there is a “clear 
probability” of being forcibly sterilized upon return.  Id.  
(internal quotation marks omitted).     
 
                                                                                                     
trier of fact could require Yuan to produce reasonable 
corroborating evidence and penalize her for failing to produce 
such corroboration or failing to adequately explain the 
failures.  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 552-54 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (holding that the BIA’s interpretation of the INA to 
permit the trier of fact to “sometimes require otherwise-
credible applicants to supply corroborating evidence in order 
to meet their burden of proof” was reasonable).            
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Here, the BIA concluded that Yuan had not met her 
burden of showing that she was reasonably likely to be 
forcibly sterilized upon return to China.  The BIA cited 
several evidentiary bases for its conclusion, including that the 
evidence proffered on birth control policies was stale or was 
irrelevant.  Without recounting again all of the BIA’s reasons, 
we note that it decided that she had failed to show she would 
be unable to pay any potential fine, and that her evidence of 
forcible sterilization was either inapposite or unauthenticated.  
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion and thus 
its decision that Yuan is not entitled to asylum. 
 
We also uphold the BIA’s denial of withholding of 
removal and CAT protection.  An applicant that fails to meet 
the eligibility requirements for asylum cannot “meet the more 
stringent applicable standard for withholding of removal,” 
Mudric v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 469 F.3d 94, 102 n.8 (3d Cir. 
2006), as was the case here.   Likewise, the evidence that is 
here insufficient to show eligibility for asylum and 
withholding of removal is also insufficient to show eligibility 
for CAT protection, since it does not show that Yuan is more 
likely than not to be tortured upon return to China.  See 8 
C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (an alien must show that it is more 
likely than not that he would be tortured, with the consent or 
acquiescence of the government, if repatriated).     
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 B. The BIA’s De Novo Review and Harmless  
  Error 
 
 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision “upon … de novo 
review.”  (App. at 3.)  Yuan argues that that was error, since, 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), the BIA is “not to 
engage in de novo review” of the IJ’s factual findings.10  The 
government effectively concedes the error but counters that 
such error was harmless, since the denial of relief was still 
supported by substantial evidence.11
                                              
10 “Facts determined by the immigration judge, 
including findings as to the credibility of testimony, shall be 
reviewed only to determine whether the findings … are 
clearly erroneous.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).   
   
11 In stating that it affirmed the IJ’s decision “upon … 
de novo review,” (App. 2 at 3), the BIA did not clearly 
indicate that it specifically reviewed de novo the IJ’s factual 
findings.  That is potentially significant, since the BIA is 
permitted to review de novo “questions of law, discretion, and 
judgment and all other issues in appeals from decisions of 
immigration judges,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii), and the BIA 
could be understood as referring to those aspects of its 
review, which would not make its review erroneous.  
However, it appears likely that the BIA did review de novo 
the IJ’s factual findings, given that it found additional, 
alternative bases upon which to discount Yuan’s evidence.  
Alternative findings are incongruent with clear error review, 
in which we would expect the BIA to limit its discussion to 
whether the IJ clearly erred in its factual findings.  
Accordingly, we take it as a given, as do the parties, that the 
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We have not applied the harmless error analysis in 
reviewing an immigration decision.  Generally, “an 
administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds 
upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were 
those upon which its action can be sustained.”  SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).  However, the 
Supreme Court has explained that “Chenery does not require 
that [the Court] convert judicial review of agency action into 
a ping-pong game” and that remand to the agency is not 
required when it “would be an idle and useless formality.”  
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969); 
see also Mass. Trustees of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 235, 246-48 (1964) (holding remand 
unnecessary when the agency’s purported error “had no 
bearing on … the substance of the decision”).   
 
Consistent with those principles, many of our sister 
circuits have applied a harmless error analysis in the 
immigration context.  See, e.g., Nadal-Ginard v. Holder, 558 
F.3d 61, 69 n.7 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that it need not reach 
the BIA’s alternative rationale for its decision, since, even if 
erroneous, it did not result in prejudice and so was effectively 
harmless error); Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 821 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (acknowledging that “the doctrine of harmless 
error is applicable to judicial review of immigration 
decisions”); Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 
391, 401 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Wyman-Gordon and 
Massachusetts Trustees and holding that remand to the BIA 
was not required “where there [was] no realistic possibility 
                                                                                                     
BIA reviewed de novo the IJ’s factual findings. 
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that, absent the errors, the IJ or BIA would have reached a 
different conclusion”); Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 
191 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (“Harmless-error analysis applies in 
immigration cases.”); Nazaraghaie v. INS, 102 F.3d 460, 465 
(10th Cir. 1996) (characterizing the BIA’s alleged failure to 
consider certain record evidence as harmless error since “the 
result in [the] case would be no different” if the case were 
remanded).   
 
We too are persuaded that harmless error analysis 
should apply in immigration cases.  Accordingly, we will 
view an error as harmless and not necessitating a remand to 
the BIA when it is highly probable that the error did not affect 
the outcome of the case.  Cf. Forrest v. Beloit Corp., 424 F.3d 
344, 349 (3d Cir. 2005) (stating in the civil context that “[a]n 
error will be deemed harmless only if it is ‘highly probable’ 
that the error did not affect the outcome of the case”); Cao He 
Lin, 428 F.3d at 402 (stating that remand is not required 
“where the IJ or BIA’s reliance on an erroneous aspect of its 
reasoning is so tangential that there is no realistic possibility 
that the outcome would be different on remand” or “where – 
notwithstanding admitted errors – overwhelming evidence 
supporting the administrative adjudicator’s findings makes it 
clear that the same decision would have been reached in the 
absence of the errors”).  
 
Applying that test here, we have no hesitation in 
saying that the BIA’s erroneous de novo review of the IJ’s 
factual findings was harmless.  As an initial matter, because 
the IJ had made factual findings adverse to Yuan, de novo 
review, which paid no deference to those adverse findings, 
was, if anything, favorable for Yuan.  Indeed, the BIA’s 
decision to deny Yuan relief is a product of the most 
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favorable standard of review Yuan could have received under 
the circumstances.  Moreover, nothing in the BIA’s decision 
manifests a disagreement with the IJ’s factual findings.  On 
the contrary, the BIA echoed and adopted several of them.  
Accordingly, it is highly probable that the outcome of Yuan’s 
case would not have been different had the BIA applied the 
proper standard of review and paid deference to the IJ’s 
adverse findings.  The BIA’s error in conducting a de novo 
review thus does not necessitate remand.    
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for 
review. 
